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The 2007–08 international food price crisis caused hard-
ship on a number of fronts. The steep rise in food prices led 
to economic difficulties for the poor and generated politi-
cal turmoil in many countries. The crisis could also result 
in  long-term,  irreversible  nutritional  damage,  especially 
among children. There is a global interest in preventing 
such events from recurring.
The price crisis was triggered by a complex set of long-
term and short-term factors, including policy failures and 
market overreactions. Rising energy prices until the middle 
of 2008, subsidized biofuel production, income and popu-
lation growth, globalization, and urbanization are among 
the major forces contributing to surging demand. On the 
supply side, land and water constraints, underinvestment 
in rural infrastructure and agricultural innovation and ac-
cess to inputs, as well as weather disruptions, are impairing 
productivity growth and the needed production response. 
Between 2000 and 2007, cereal demand exceeded cereal 
production and cereal stocks have consequently declined. 
Demand for agricultural commodities for food, feed, and 
fuel use is likely to continue to escalate. Climate change 
risks  and  rising  energy  demand  could  reaccelerate  food 
prices in the future. (von Braun et al., 2008; von Braun 
2008a,b,c; Bakary, 2008; Brahmbhatt and Christiaensen, 
2008; OECD Policy Report, 2008; Sommer and Gilbert, 
2006; UNCTAD Policy Brief, 2008; and World Agricul-
tural Outlook Board, 2008) 
Table 1. Explanations for rise in agricultural commodity prices
Factors Mechanism Effects
Demand-side	factors:
Income growth, population 
growth, and urbanization 
Cereal demand has been growing at 2–3 percent per year, thanks 
to rising incomes in China, India, and, more recently, Sub‐Saharan 
Africa. Meanwhile, yield growth in these cereals has declined from 
3 percent in the 1970s to 1–2 percent in the 1990s.
This	resulted	in	a	significant	reduction	of	cereal	reserves	to	less	than	400	
million tons in 2007 from 700 million tons in 2000.
Ethanol/Biofuels
With oil prices at an all-time high of more than US$120 a barrel 
in May 2008 and with the United States and the European Union 
subsidizing agriculture-based energy, farmers have shifted their 




of long-term impact on weighted cereal prices of the acceleration in biofuel 
production from 2000 to 2007 to be 30 percent in real terms. 
Supply-side factors:




The neglect of agriculture in public investment, research, and 
service policies during the past decade has undermined its key role 
for economic growth.
As a result, agriculture productivity growth has declined and is too low. 
Droughts/Climate	change Occurring in large grain-producing nations, droughts and climate 
change have  lowered worldwide production. More volatile weather patterns related to climate change increased.
Other factors:
Dollar	devaluation The indicator prices of most commodities are quoted in U.S .dol-




Large excess of liquidity in non-G7 
countries
Large excess liquidity in several non-G7 countries, nourished by 
the low interest rates set by G7 central banks. 
Commodity prices are the result of portfolio shifts against liquid assets 
by sovereign investors, sovereign wealth funds, partly triggered by lax 
monetary	policy,	especially	in	the	United	States	(For	details,	see	Calvo	2008	
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In  addition  to  the  supply  and 
demand  fundamentals  there  is  sub-
stantial  evidence  that  the  crisis  was 
made  worse  by  the  malfunctioning 
of  world  grain  markets  and  by  re-
sponse of countries to protect their 
own  internal  consumption.  These 
reactions begin as consequences, not 
causes,  of  the  price  crisis,  but  they 
exacerbate the crisis and increase the 
risks posed by high prices. By creat-
ing a positive feedback loop with high 
food prices, they take on a life of their 
own, increasing the prices and their 
volatility  even  more,  with  adverse 
consequences  for  the  poor  and  for 
long-term incentives for agricultural 
production. Because they impede the 
free flow of food to where it is most 
needed and the free flow of price sig-
nals to farmers, these market failures 
impose enormous efficiency losses on 
the  global  food  system,  hitting  the 
poorest countries hardest. This paper 
tries to understand what was behind 
the price spike and to propose some 
alternative policy solutions that could 
prevent this from happening in the 
future.
Causes Behind The Price Spike
Changes in supply and demand fun-
damentals  cannot  fully  explain  the 
price spike in the first six months of 
2008. As a result, a “price spike” above 
what is explainable by fundamentals 
occurred during the first six months 
of 2008 as depicted in Figure 1.  
There are two major explanations 
behind this price spike. First, ad hoc 
trade  policy  interventions,  such  as 
export bans or high export tariffs or 
high  import  subsidies  were  partly 
triggered by the price crisis and ex-
acerbated  the  crisis  symptoms.  As 
of April 2008, 15 countries [Argen-
tina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, 
China,  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  India,  Ka-
zakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, 
Tanzania,  Vietnam,  and  Zambia] 
including  major  producers  imposed 
export  restrictions  on  agricultural 
commodities, thereby narrowing the 
global  market.  For  instance,  China 
banned rice and maize exports, while 
India  banned  exports  of  rice  and 
pulses. Argentina raised export taxes 
on soybeans, maize, wheat and beef; 
and  Ethiopia  and Tanzania  banned 
exports of major cereals. Export bans 
ensured greater food availability do-
mestically, but they also reduced the 
market  for  agricultural  products, 
increased  price  volatility,  and  wors-
ened market conditions for import-
dependent countries. In addition, ex-
port bans stimulate the formation of 
cartels, undermine trust in trade, and 
encourage protectionism. Among the 
countries imposing new or additional 
price controls are Benin, China, Ma-
laysia,  and  Senegal.  Other  nations, 
however, have contributed to the ex-
pansion of the global food demand. 
Some net-food importing developing 
countries reduced import barriers—
in principle a welcome move toward 
more open trade, but one that added 
to  the  upward  pressure  on  prices. 
Morocco cut tariffs on wheat imports 
from  130  to  2.5%;  Nigeria  slashed 
duties on rice imports from 100 to 
2.7%; Peru removed import taxes on 
wheat and maize; and Senegal waived 
duties on cereal imports.
Policy  responses  such  as  export 
bans or high export tariffs may reduce 
risks of food shortages in the short-
term for the respective country, but 
they are likely to backfire by making 
the international market smaller and 
more  volatile.  At  the  country  level, 
price controls reduce farmers’ incen-
tives to produce more food and divert 
resources away from those who need 
them most. 
Export restrictions or policy fail-
ures have harmful effects on import-
dependent trading partners. For ex-
ample, export restrictions on rice in 
India  affect  Bangladeshi  consumers 
adversely and also dampen the incen-
tives for rice farmers in India to invest 
in agriculture, which is a long-term 
driver of growth. IFPRI simulations 
with the MIRAGE global trade mod-
el had shown that these trade restric-
tions can explain as much as 30% of 
the increase in prices in the first six 
months of 2008. These IFPRI model-
ing results from the MIRAGE model 
should be taken as a conservative es-
timate. IFPRI models neither factor 
in speculation over and above market 
fundamentals, nor the increased price 
impacts  of  any  quantity  change  in 
the much more narrow international 
market.
Secondly, the flow of speculative 
capital from financial investors into 
agricultural commodity markets was 
significant. From May 2007 to May 
2008, the volume of globally traded 
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grain  futures  and  options  increased 
substantially  (Table  2).  Another  in-
dicator  of  speculative  activity—the 
ratio of the monthly volume of fu-
tures trading to open interest—also 
increased substantially. Open interest 
describes the total number of futures 
contracts of a given commodity that 
have not yet been offset by an oppo-
site futures contract or fulfilled by de-
livery of the commodity. A speculator 
taking opposite positions in the mar-
ket within days or weeks will gener-
ate an increase in monthly registered 
volumes but little change in monthly 
open  interest.  Therefore  changes  in 
this ratio should capture changes in 
speculative activity. In 2008, soybean 
and rice ratios of futures to open inter-
est were increasing at 27% and 19% 
respectively,  as  wheat  ratios  contin-
ued to grow at 19% and maize ratios 
declined slightly. In contrast, in 2005 
and 2006 at least three commodities’ 
ratios were declining on average.  
We  conducted  several  statistical 
tests to determine the role of specula-
tive activity in commodity prices. The 
results suggest that speculation might 
have been influential. 
Our analysis tested to what extent 
the selected indicators for speculative 
activity can help forecast spot price 
movements (Robles, Torero, and von 
Braun,  2009).  The  Granger  causal-
ity  test—which  determines  whether 
past movements in one variable can 
help  explain  current  movements  in 
another one—was applied to each ag-
ricultural commodity (Table 3). The 
results show that the size of trading 
activity  in  futures  contracts—when 
measured by volume or open inter-
est separately—do not show evidence 
of  affecting  commodity  prices.  The 
ratio of monthly volume to open in-
terest in futures contracts, however, 
has an influence in forecasting price 
movements  for  wheat  and  rice.  In 
other words, past changes in this ratio 
help to forecast future changes in the 
prices of wheat and rice. In the case 
of rice, the ratio of noncommercial 
long positions to total long positions 
also has an effect on prices. When the 
same ratio for short positions was an-
alyzed, there was additional evidence 
that  speculation  affects  prices,  with 
significant results in the soybean mar-
ket. Finally, when we tested whether 
net positions of index traders (since 
2006 the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing  Commission  provides  informa-
tion on futures and options trading 
by a new category of traders in select-
ed agricultural markets, the so- called 
“index traders”) since January 2006 
have  any  influence  on  commodity 
prices, we found positive evidence in 
the case of maize. 
There is evidence, therefore, that 
speculative  activity  partly  explains 
the price spike since January 2008. 
Appropriate  global  institutional  ar-
rangements for preventing this kind 
of market failure are needed. 
What Can Be Done
The price spike episode clearly high-
lights the need to modify the insti-
tutional architecture of international 
financial and agricultural markets to 
address their effects on the livelihoods 
of the poor.
On the export bans there should 
be no illusion: this problem cannot 
be addressed country by country, as 
governments have the legitimate in-
terest to care for their citizens first. 
The new wave of export restrictions 
requires  urgent  international  atten-
tion. It should not be added on top 
of the WTO Doha Round. Instead, 
it should be addressed by an ad hoc 
forum  of  a  consortium  of  global 
players with a code of conduct and 
mutual trust building in political ne-
gotiations. At least, export trade for 
Table 2. Evidence of speculation activity affecting commodity price








Soybean oil 46 69
Wheat 17 45
Rough rice 48 41
Source: Chicago Board of Trade 2008. 
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humanitarian purposes should be re-
opened now. 
On speculation, there are two tra-
ditional options. The first is to build 
up  a  significant  physical,  public, 
globally managed grain reserve. In a 
globalized world, however, the scale 
of reserves required under this option 
would make storage costs excessive. A 
physical reserve is thus not appropri-
ate as a major global initiative, but 
only as a minor one to address the 
need  for  smooth  emergency  opera-
tions. 
The  second  option  is  to  change 
regulation  of  commodity  exchanges 
to  limit  the  volume  of  speculation 
versus hedging, to make delivery on 
contracts  or  portions  of  contracts 
compulsory,  and  to  impose  capital 
deposit requirements when each fu-
tures  transaction  is  made.  Difficul-
ties could arise, however, in walking 
a line between ineffective regulations 
and  overzealous  ones.  Market  regu-
lation  also  raises  political  economy 
concerns: regulatory measures could 
benefit relatively small groups, elites 
may  capture  the  regulatory  agency, 
international  regulatory  agreements 
might not be completed, and coun-
tries  may  lack  the  institutional  ca-
pacity to implement and enforce the 
regulatory measures. Although some 
improvement in regulation is called 
for, regulating commodity exchanges 
in harmony across the globe appears 
too complex a collective action prob-
lem given very different country cir-
cumstances. 
The two global collective actions 
we  propose—a  small,  independent 
physical emergency reserve to mini-
mize the risk of lack of access to the 
minimum level of grains required for 
humanitarian assistance, and a virtual 
reserve and intervention mechanism 
backed  up  by  a  financial  fund—
would  avoid  these  problems  while 
ensuring that the world can respond 
to emergency needs for food and pre-
vent extreme price bubbles. 
The Independent Emergency 
Reserve
A  modest  emergency  reserve  of 
around  300,000–500,000  metric 
tons  of  basic  grains—about  5%  of 
the current food aid flows of 6.7 mil-
lion wheat-equivalent metric tons—
would be supplied by the main grain-
producing countries and funded by 
a  group  of  countries  participating 
in the scheme (the G8+5 plus some 
other  major  grain-exporting  coun-
tries).  This  decentralized  reserve 
would be located at strategic points 
near or in major developing-country 
regions, using existing national stor-
age facilities. The reserve, to be used 
exclusively  for  emergency  response 
and  humanitarian  assistance,  would 
be  managed  by  the  World  Food 
Program  (WFP).  The  WFP  would 
have access to the grain at precrisis 
market prices to reduce the need for 
short-term  ad  hoc  fundraising.  To 
cover the cost of restoring the reserve 
to its initial level (that is, the differ-
ence between the postcrisis price and 
the precrisis price times the quantity 
of reserves used by WFP), an emer-
gency fund should be created and its 
level maintained by the participating 
countries. The fund should be accom-
panied by a financing facility that the 
WFP could draw upon as needed to 
cope with potentially increased trans-
port costs, as experienced in the 2008 
crisis. This arrangement could also be 
defined under a newly designed Food 
Aid Convention.
The Virtual Reserve
The virtual reserve would be imple-
mented  as  a  coordinated  commit-
ment by the member countries (the 
G8+5 plus some other major grain-
exporting  countries).  Each  country 
would  commit  to  supplying  funds, 
if needed, for intervention in the fu-
tures market. The fund would nor-
mally  consist  not  of  actual  budget 
expenditures,  but  of  promissory,  or 
virtual,  financing  by  the  members. 
These  funds  would  be  drawn  upon 
by the high-level technical commis-
sion only when needed for interven-
tion  in  the  futures  market  (much 
previous evidence has shown a link 
between  futures  and  spot  markets). 
The intervention mechanism will be 
two-pronged. First, and perhaps most 
important,  the  global  intelligence 
unit  will  announce  price  forecasts 
and specify the price band. This an-
nouncement  will  be  a  signal—or  a 
threat—to speculators that interven-
tion is likely if futures prices exceed 
the defined upper limit of the price 
band. Moreover, the announcement 
will specify a confidence interval for 
the upper limit to increase the risk for 
potential speculators. 
Second,  if,  despite  the  signal, 
there is evidence of an emerging price 
bubble,  an  autonomous  technical 
commission will then decide whether 
to  intervene  in  the  futures  market. 
This intervention would consist of ex-
ecuting a number of progressive short 
sales  (that  is,  selling  a  firm  prom-
ise—a  futures  contract—to  deliver 
the commodity at a later date at the 
specified price) over a specific period 
of time in futures markets at market 
prices at a variety of different future 
positions until futures prices and spot 
prices decline to levels within the es-
timated price bands. This increase in 
the supply of short sales will reduce 
spot prices and should make specu-
lators  move  out  of  the  market—in 
other words, a backwardation will be 
created (the situation in which, and 
the amount by which, the price of a 
commodity for future delivery is low-
er than the spot price or a far future 
delivery price is lower than a nearer 
future delivery price). Moving specu-
lators out of the market will minimize 
the potential second-round effects of 
this intervention given that spot pric-
es will return to being consistent with 
fundamentals, and therefore the low-
er spot prices should not result in the 
accelerated use of available supplies. 
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by offsetting purchases or sales (the 
vast  majority  of  agricultural  futures 
contracts  are  settled  this  way)  or 
through delivery of the actual physi-
cal commodity. The virtual fund will 
thus come into play only if there is 
a need to realize the futures sales, in 
which case the fund will be used to 
obtain the necessary grain supply to 
comply and calm the markets. Usu-
ally, this action would not be neces-
sary and the whole operation would 
stay virtual. The innovative concept 
behind the virtual reserve is the sig-
nal that it gives to markets, includ-
ing speculators. Its presence alone is 
likely to divert speculators from en-
tering this market. Nonetheless, the 
commission must be ready to trade 
grain when necessary and to assume 
the costs if in the future it must buy 
back contracts at a higher price than 
it sold them for.
Preliminary  estimates  show  that 
for the virtual reserve to be a credible 
signal, the fund should be US$12–20 
billion. A fund of this size might cov-
er 30 to 50% of normal grain trade 
volume. Determining the exact size of 
this fund will require further analysis, 
however, because commodity futures 
markets allow for high levels of lever-
age.
The proposals made here are de-
signed not to stabilize prices gener-
ally, but to prevent damaging price 
spikes.  The  proposed  actions  will 
entail costs, but the modest costs of 
the required organizational elements 
must  be  balanced  against  the  ben-
efits  of  more  effective  international 
financial architecture. These benefits 
will include prevention of economic 
hardship, improved market efficiency, 
stronger incentives for long-term in-
vestment in agriculture, and preven-
tion of political instability. 
Concluding Comments 
The excess price surges caused by spec-
ulation and possible hoarding could 
have severe effects on confidence in 
global  grain  markets,  thereby  ham-
pering  the  market’s  performance  in 
responding  to  fundamental  changes 
in supply, demand, and costs of pro-
duction. More important, they could 
result  in  unreasonable  or  unwanted 
price fluctuations that can harm the 
poor and result in long-term, irrevers-
ible  nutritional  damage,  especially 
among children.
Appropriate  global  institutional 
arrangements  for  preventing  these 
market failures are missing. A glob-
al  solution  that  prevents  excessive 
speculation in food markets may be 
costly, but given the losses created by 
food price crises like the one in 2007–
08, it will still have large positive net 
returns. It is clear that the incentives 
for speculation in food commodities 
could  be  reduced  by  (1)  changing 
regulatory  frameworks  to  limit  the 
volume  of  speculation  versus  hedg-
ing, (2) making delivery on contracts 
or portions of contracts compulsory, 
(3) imposing capital deposit require-
ments when each futures transaction 
is made, or all three. These regulatory 
measures could be implemented case 
by case or as a platform through an 
international “alliance of commodity 
exchanges”. Therefore there is a clear 
need (a) to undertake a policy debate 
about  exchange  regulation  and  the 
role of speculative traders and (b) that 
debate is very likely to include the is-
sue of international harmonization.
A  new  global  institutional  ar-
rangement  encompassing  a  “virtual 
reserve” could be an alternative solu-
tion (see for implementation details 
von Braun and Torero, 2009). This 
virtual reserve would consist of a co-
ordinated  commitment  by  member 
countries  (the  Group  of  Eight  Plus 
Five  plus  some  other  major  grain-
exporting  countries  such  as  Argen-
tina, Thailand, and Vietnam). Each 
country would commit to supplying 
funds, if needed, for intervention in 
the  futures  market.  The  innovative 
concept behind the virtual reserve is 
the signal that it would give to mar-
kets, including speculators. Although 
its presence alone would likely divert 
speculators  from  entering  this  mar-
ket, the virtual reserve must be ready 
to trade grain when necessary. This 
concept  could  provide  the  kind  of 
global collective action that is needed 
to  facilitate  well-functioning  grain 
markets and to reduce the harm that 
can result from excessive price spikes. 
There are two major concerns that 
need to be taken into account. The 
first is the importance of the global 
intelligence unit and their challeng-
ing  role  in  price  forecasting. To  be 
a credible basis for market interven-
tion,  price  forecasts  must  contain 
some new knowledge, widely regard-
ed as credible when released, that is 
not already reflected in the structure 
of  market  prices.  This  new  knowl-
edge is the combination of both the 
fundamentals component (i.e. supply 
and demand factors) and a midterm/
long-term financial model in which 
stochastic factors are captured.  Sec-
ondly, a potential caveat of the pro-
posed virtual reserve concept is that 
it requires cross-country coordinated 
institutional  design  which  has  the 
risk that one of the country members 
won’t comply with the jointly agreed 
upon  commitment.  For  example, 
one of the country members doesn’t 
comply with providing the resources 
for the “emergency reserve” or with 
supplying the necessary financial re-
sources for the “virtual reserve”. To 
minimize this caveat, clear rules for 
the  participating  countries  should 
be developed and dispute resolution 
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Finally, to evaluate these actions, 
a  comprehensive  cost/benefit  assess-
ment  must  go  beyond  agricultural 
markets  (and  must  include  security 
and poverty considerations). The sys-
tem should be exposed to evaluation 
of effectiveness, and to close monitor-
ing while being implemented.
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